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The Role of Preference Structure and
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Università degli Studi “Roma Tre” 
This paper proposes an analysis of financial crises by a multiple
equilibria model, based on the assumption of common knowledge.
This model modifies and broadens the Corsetti, Guimaraes and
Roubini (2003) model based on global games theory. In the first part
we assert the implications for the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
as an international lender of last resort, utilising existing literature
based on multiple equilibria models. In the second part, we extend the
analysis and highlight the interesting implications. The model predicts
the IMF should not be too conservative in its decisions, while avoiding
the excessive liquidity supports, which can lead to moral hazard
distortions. [JEL Classifications: F33, F34]
1. - Introduction
In the last decade there have been several currency and
financial crises in emerging market economies: from Mexico in
1994 to the Argentine default in 2001. Economic literature has
tried, from time to time, to find the main causes for every crisis
and their proper remedies. In this connection, a particularly
relevant role for economic research has been played by the Asian
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recognizes some main causes: as well as solvency problems there
are liquidity problems and currency imbalances. Moreover, a
determining role is played by agents’ expectations in the economy.
In the new literature, emerging after the Asian crisis, some
models are based on the analogy between speculative crises and
bank runs, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) — see for istance
Chang and Velasco (2001); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Rodrik and
Velasco (1999); Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001). This parallel is due
to the fact that debt runs and the banking sector are strictly
interlinked
1. In most cases, banks are vulnerable to such runs
because they have short-term (or foreign currency denominated)
debts, while the most of their assets are long-term and
denominated in domestic currency, with high costs for the
liquidation of the investments. Several third-generation models
concentrate on the importance of currency and maturity
mismatches (Krugman, 1999; Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee,
2000; Cespedes, Chang and Velasco, 2000; Jeanne and Zettelmeyer,
2002).
These types of models are mainly based on an information
structure that is common knowledge among the agents in the
economy. Every agent is aware of the equilibrium strategy
undertaken by all the other agents. This structure implies that
there’s no heterogeneity among the agents’ behaviour inside the
economy and multiple equilibria
2. In this view, panic crises can
be seen as a switch from one equilibrium to another due to
changes in agents’ expectations. The multiplicity of equilibria is
bounded by the possibility that fundamentals are so strong that
they can rule out the possibility of a crisis. It is important to note
that this type of financial and currency fragility is not caused by
market irrationality. Instead, both the equilibria are consistent
with the rational expectations hypothesis. 
The main limit of these models is the lack of explanation of
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1  In SACHS  J. (1998), foreign creditors consider the stock of international
reserves as liquid collateral against their loans to the country.
2 A useful example of a model with self-fulfilling speculative attacks and bank
runs can be found in OBSTFELD M. (1998).the factors determining agents’ coordination on one equilibrium
rather than another. Moreover, these models, having multiple
equilibria, lead to the conclusion that the best policies to avoid a
crisis should completely eliminate the possibility that the agents
coordinate on the crisis equilibrium. A prescription of this kind is
the institution of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR)
which can prevent bank runs from happening, by a complete bailout
of the country. This is the solution proposed by Jeanne (2000),
among several others. The current international financial institution
which could best play this role is the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
3. The main failure of this prescription is the trade-off between
liquidity provision by the ILOLR and moral hazard distortions
4.
Most recent contributions have tried to address the open
issues left by the preceding literature. The foundation of this
theoretical development is based on the global games approach,
presented by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). These models allow
for the possibility that part of the information about the economic
fundamentals, instead of being public as the common knowledge
assumption asserts, can be private
5. In an important contribution,
Morris and Shin (1998) have built a theory of speculation, based
on global games, in which agents have private and incomplete
information about the state of fundamentals and other agents’
information and behaviour. These models give rise to different
implications of economic policy from the ones deriving from the
multiple-equilibria models, having a unique equilibrium. 
Hence, agents face strategic uncertainty about the behaviour
of the rest of the market, but they are able to build an individual
equilibrium strategy, the main result being the achievement of a
unique equilibrium. 
The new literature suggests that a crisis becomes more likely
when the fundamentals are weaker. The recent contribution of
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3 For two different opinions about the viability of the IMF operating as an
ILOLR see JEANNE O. - WYPLOSZ C. (2001) and FISCHER S. (1999).
4 DOOLEY M. - VERMA S. (2001) show that IMF lending can create moral hazard
distortions and make crises more costly.
5 A critical approach to multiple equilibria models can be found in MORRIS S.
- SHIN H. (2000), while a comparison between the two approaches can be found
in CORSETTI G. - PESENTI P. - ROUBINI N. (2002). Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2003) — henceforth CGR — and
Morris and Shin (2003) uses this information structure to develop
an analysis of moral hazard distortions and catalytic finance
caused by IMF interventions.
The model presented in this paper, starting from the existing
literature, analyzes some particularly relevant topics of this
literature. Given the ever growing role of transparency and the
availability of public information, we have adopted the hypothesis
of common knowledge among agents, as in the traditional
literature of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Hence we
will have multiple equilibria. In order to develop a useful
comparison between the results coming from different hypotheses
on the information structure, we based our model on the
framework of CGR in the developing of our model. It analyzes
debt crises in a real economy (without currency). In sections 2-4
we present the model and we will see the interactions between
liquidity and solvency problems and IMF interventions. In section
5 we will see the particular role played by the different preference
structures of the IMF and fund managers in determining the
equilibrium, showing a generalized structure. In section 6, we will
consider incentive distortions that can emerge because of moral
hazard, obtaining results in line with CGR (though not completely
general). 
2. - The Model
As previously noted, the core framework of this model is based
on that of CGR. Consider a small open economy with a three-
period horizon – t = 0, 1, 2. In the economy, there is a continuum
of domestic agents of mass 1, with every agent of mass zero.
Analogously , there is a continuum of international fund managers
of mass 1, with zero individual mass. 
The starting endowment of the economy is E. The domestic
agents can borrow foreign short-term debt up to D — with term
t = 1 — from fund managers. Furthermore the IMF can supply
the country with a liquidity support L. For simplicity we suppose
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r*, which is normalized to zero. 
Domestic agents invest in long-term risky projects, which yield
a stochastic rate of return R in  t = 2. The expected return is
naturally above the international interest rate: E0R > 1 + r*. The
early liquidation of the investments (in t = 1) is costly, with a cost
k > 0. Hence, if the project is discounted and liquidated early, it
yields  R/(1+k). We hypothesize that the capital is infinitely
divisible: so the early liquidation of part of the investments in t =1
doesn’t affect the rate of return of the other investments. 
In  t = 0 domestic agents invest their own endowments and
the borrowed resources (E + D) in domestic risky projects I, and
in international liquidity reserves M. It is worth noting that, in
t =0, there isn’t a real decision process. In fact the game is between
fund managers and the IMF. E, D, M, I are all given parameters. 
In t =1 fund managers decide whether to roll over their loans
or withdraw. Denoting with x the fraction of managers who decide
to withdraw their loans, xD is the fraction of debt that is not rolled
over and must be paid back. CGR assume incomplete information,
hence every fund manager has to choose her equilibrium strategy
facing strategic uncertainty about the others’ actions. In this
environment, the managers’ behaviour will be heterogeneous. Here
we assume common knowledge among the agents, leading to no
heterogeneity in agents’ behaviour and only two extreme
equilibrium conjectures will take place, that is x =0  (everybody
rolls over their loans) and x =1  (nobody rolls over their loans).
Conditional on x =0  in t = 1, GNP in t =2  will be: 
Y = RI + M – D
When D > RI + M there is default and GNP is 0. In case of
default, all lenders are paid pro-rata, until exhausting the
resources available to the country
6.
Conditional on x =1  in t = 1, D is the amount of liquid reserves
necessary to the country. To meet short-term obligations D,
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6 In what follows we take GNP as a measure of national welfare.domestic agents can use their stock of liquid resources M; if this
is not enough, they can also liquidate a fraction z of the long term
I, getting zRI/(1+k), with z  ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover the country can
receive funds up to L by the IMF. Let Λ =  M + L denote total
liquidity available to the country, made by the predetermined
component M and the contingent component L. The country will
incur some liquidation costs and efficiency loss when D >  Λ; it
will default when D > Λ + RI / (1+k) because domestic agents are
not able to meet their short-term obligations despite complete
liquidation of long term investments. 
In t = 2 the country total resources consist of RI(1 – z) plus
any liquid resources left over from the previous period, i.e.
(Λ–D)+. Its liabilities consist of any IMF loan L. Hence, GNP will
be:
Y = RI(1–z) + (Λ–D) – L+
If  Λ is not enough to pay back the debt D, agents must
liquidate part of their investments, up to zRI/(1+k), then:
Having (Λ –  D)+ = 0, solving for z the above formula and
substituting in RI(1–z), GNP becomes: 
Y = RI – (1+k)(D–Λ)–L+
Naturally the GNP is zero in the event of default, that happens
if (1+ k)(D – Λ) + L+ > RI.
2.1 Payoffs and Information
Fund managers and the IMF face a structure of payoffs that
depends on the decisions taken, as in Rochet and Vives (2005) and
in CGR. When the country does not default, rolling over loans to
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The difference in utility between rolling over loans and
withdrawing is equal to a positive constant b. On the other hand,
when the country defaults, managers who do not withdraw their
loans pay a cost: the difference in utility between rolling over and
withdrawing is equal to – c (< 0).
The IMF is conservative in its decisions, in the sense that it
is willing to lend to illiquid countries, trying to reduce early
liquidation costs; but it is not willing to lend to insolvent countries,
for which its liquidity support would become subsidized loans.
For simplicity we assume that the structure of payoffs of the IMF
is analogous to that of fund managers. If the country ends up not
defaulting, lending L rather than denying it, gives a benefit equal
to B. If the country defaults, by lending L rather than denying it,
the IMF get a negative utility equal to – C. Different values of b,
c, B, C may represent changes in the strategies of fund managers
and the IMF. For the sake of simplicity, we initially consider the
case of identical preferences between the IMF and fund managers,
that is B = b, C = c. Note that, the utility for fund managers and
the IMF is independent of the extent of default
7. 
In accordance with our assumption of common knowledge —
and unlike CGR — there will be public information (though
incomplete). Hence there is a single public signal about the state
of fundamentals R, equal for all and known by everybody, so that
the mean and the variance of its probability distribution function
is common knowledge. Hence, agents do not face strategic
uncertainty about their optimal strategy. In t = 1, the signal is:
(1) S = R + η
whereas η is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1/ρ.
Both international fund managers and the IMF, on the basis
of the received signal, decide their strategy — rolling over their
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7 This hypothesis implies that we abstract from distributional issues of the
available resources between the country and the creditors, as well as between the
IMF and fund managers, following a debt crisis.loans rather than withdrawing, and providing the liquidity support
L respectively. Fund managers roll over their loans if the public
signal is such that their payoff is non-negative; likewise the IMF
provides the liquidity if, given the public signal, this action is
associated with a non-negative payoff. Given the parameters
describing the preference structure — b, c, B, C — we can calculate
the threshold values of the signal under which agents switch their
behaviour. 
Remember that, with the assumption of common knowledge,
the equilibrium behaviour of fund managers is symmetric in
equilibrium — there is no heterogeneity. In fact, because of
receiving the same signal and having the same preference
structure, they always undertake the same action in equilibrium.
Moreover, every fund manager has an infinitesimal dimension,
then he/she cannot influence the rest of the market and the
macroeconomic performance of the country in t = 2. Hence none
of them are interested in deviating from the action undertaken by
the rest of the market, which will be optimal in equilibrium. 
We  have a different assumption about the IMF. It has not
infinitesimal dimension (it is modelled as a large player) and by
its own actions is able to influence the rest of the market. Hence
the IMF does not need to conform itself to the actions undertaken
by the rest of the market and can choose its behaviour
independently. 
3. - Equilibria
Agents follow a trigger strategy. Every fund manager considers
two equilibrium conjectures, that are: x = 0, everybody rolls over
their loans to the country; and x = 1, everybody withdraws their
loans in t = 1. Only these two actions are relevant in equilibrium.
In fact, all agents and the signal are identical, so all fund managers
will coordinate on the same action
8.
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8 There cannot be ranges for which fund managers are indifferent between the
two equilibrium conjectures. A complete proof can be found in CORSETTI  G. -
PESENTI P. - ROUBINI N. (2002).Conditional on x = 0, the solvency condition, is: RI ≥ D – M.
The minimum rate of return under which the country defaults is:
(2)
It does not depend on the liquidity support L, just because
there isn’t any early withdrawal. When R < RS the country is not
solvent and will always default.
Conditional on x = 1, the liquidity support L provided by the
IMF influences the minimum rate of return under which there is
default. Above all, the dimension of L will affect the definition of
equilibria, in fact L may be either bigger or smaller than the
financing gap of the country (D – M). 
If  L < D – M the country certainly experiences some
liquidation costs. The solvency condition is: RI (1 – z) ≥ L. The










Instead, if L > D – M the IMF can solve on its own, by the







Rx=1 depends on the liquidity support L. If L is
bounded, the IMF can lessen the liquidation costs of a run by the
fund managers only within a certain range of fundamentals.
Instead, if L is unbounded, there isn’t a liquidity problem anymore
and the country will default only if not solvent. 
However, as we have seen above, the IMF intervenes only if
its payoff is non-negative, otherwise it doesn’t provide any liquidity
support  L to the country. If fund managers coordinate on the
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If threshold values of signals are identical, in equilibrium the
IMF provides the liquidity support L only when fund managers
decide to roll over their loans. 
Now we are able to determine the threshold values of signals
that characterize the equilibrium. The signal about the state of
fundamentals, though being common knowledge, is not of
complete information. Then, fund managers may undertake their
actions with some mismatching in comparison with solvency
thresholds. As noted above, the signal is the same for all, and all
fund managers undertake the same action in equilibrium. 
Considering the two equilibrium conjectures, we know that,
conditional on x = 0, the country defaults if and only if R < RS.
Then, given the signal S, fund managers withdraw their loans if
and only if: 
–cProb(R<R S|S)+b[1–Prob(R<R S|S)]≥0
The threshold value of S under which they decide to withdraw is: 
–cProb(R<R S|S*)+b[1–Prob(R<R S|S*)]=0
that becomes:
Since Prob(R<R S|S*)=N(RS–S*), 
we will have: 
so:
(6)
S* is the threshold, conditional on x = 0, under which fund
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S* everybody withdraws. 
Conditional on x = 1, and given a signal S about the state of
fundamentals, the IMF decides to intervene if and only if its payoff
is non-negative, in other words, if and only if it expects R>
–
RL. As
we have seen above, the liquidity provision L, provided by the
IMF, may be either bigger or smaller than the financing gap of
the country. Now we consider the case when L < D – M. In this






As above, we have the threshold under which the IMF does
not provide the liquidity support L to the country: 
(7)
As we can see from the two thresholds determined up to now,
they also depend on the preferences of the considered agents.
Hence, when the preference structure of fund managers and the
IMF is identical, the threshold, conditional on x = 1, under which
everybody switch their behaviour is the same for all. 
Therefore, the threshold under which fund managers decide
not to roll over their loans is: 
(8)
Since RS < 
–
RL, then S* < S*. For values of the signal larger
than S* — and so also larger than S*
IMF — the IMF provides the
country with the liquidity support L and fund managers decide to
roll over their loans to the country. Instead, for values of the signal
smaller than S* the IMF doesn’t provide the liquidity support L
and fund managers withdraw their loans. Note that, provided the
hypothesis of common knowledge, both fund managers and the
IMF know to have the same preferences as each other and the
same threshold value conditional on x = 1. In this case 
–
RL is the
only relevant threshold value of fundamentals. 
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of these models is that there may be multiple equilibria for some
values of fundamentals. If S > S*, the perception about the state
of fundamentals is so good that (irrespective of which equilibrium
threshold is selected) a complete withdrawal will never occur
(x = 0). If S < S* , the state of fundamentals seems so bad that
the market will always coordinate on the crisis equilibrium (x = 1).
But, when S* < S < S*, the actions of the market and the
equilibrium definition will depend on which relevant threshold is
chosen by fund managers. If S* is chosen, there isn’t any
withdrawal (x = 0); and although the IMF does not intervene, there
will not be a crisis. But, if S* is chosen, there would be the
opposite situation. This model leads to conclusions substantially
different from those arising in CGR, where the model predicts a
unique equilibrium. It is important to note that these differences
are exclusively due to different assumptions about the structure
of information. 
PROPOSITION 1: In the model with common knowledge, and
with L < D – M, there is a unique equilibrium for values of the
signal S ≤ S* e S > S*. There are multiple equilibria for values of
the signal belonging to the range S* < S ≤ S*.
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GRAPH 1
DETERMINATION OF EQUILIBRIA AS IN PROPOSITION 1.
S* S*These models, based on multiple equilibria, do not have an
endogenous mechanism of the equilibrium threshold selection and
what determines the choice of one threshold over the other is not
explained by the model
9. Within this context, the IMF is only able
to influence the threshold
–
RL, but not the others and does not have
any role in the threshold selection. Crises are always possible.
Therefore, if the IMF operates with limited liquidity provisions (as
in CGR), it is not able to eliminate the possibility of a liquidity crisis. 
The IMF is able to completely eliminate the possibility of a
liquidity crisis only by intervening with a liquidity support L > D
– M, that is acting solely as an ILOLR. In this case, we have a
unique relevant solvency threshold, that is RS. Then, there is a
unique equilibrium, with a crisis happening if and only if R < RS.
Also the only equilibrium conjecture by fund managers is about
R < RS. In this case, there can be only a solvency crisis. Also now
the signal may not coincide with the exact value of fundamentals,
hence, we can express the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2: In the same model, with L > D – M, there is
a unique equilibrium determined by the threshold S*. 
Then, this model, founded on the hypothesis of common
knowledge, has economic policy implications about the IMF
corresponding perfectly to the ones deriving from the multiple
equilibria literature — see, for instance, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer
(2002); Chang and Velasco (2001). The IMF is able to solve the
liquidity problem only if it has enough resources to eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore it must act as an international
lender of last resort. 
4. - Preferences and Thresholds Definition
Our hypothesis of common knowledge does not imply that
the threshold values of signals must coincide with the threshold
values of fundamentals. Thus, the possibility of a crisis depends
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9  Arbitrary probabilities are often associated with the possible thresholds
between which the equilibrium is determined. Naturally these probabilities should
be known ex-ante, and they deeply influence the equilibrium determination. on the relative positioning of the threshold values of the signals
with respect to macroeconomic fundamentals. We have seen that
these thresholds depend on the payoff parameters b, c, B, C.
Therefore the equilibrium depends on the agents’ preferences
10. In
this section we continue to assume identical preferences between
fund managers and the IMF. 
Being  η≈n(0, 1/ρ),  η is symmetric to the origin, then the
cumulative distribution function N(0) = 1/2. Hence we have
N
–1(1/2) = 0. 
When:
that is when:
and the threshold signals are shifted to the right of the threshold
rates. 
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10 While, in the perfect information framework, the equilibrium is independent
of them.
GRAPH 2




Naturally, the actions of the market are always the same
regarding the thresholds. If S  ≤ S*, everybody withdraws their
loans and the country defaults. Note that a crisis occurs for all
values being within the range (RS; S*), though the country is stillsolvent. If S > S* nobody withdraws, the IMF intervenes and the
country does not default. When S* < S < S*, we have, as above,
multiple equilibria. If the equilibrium conjecture chosen is x = 1,
when  S < S* fund managers do not roll over their loans to the
country and the IMF decides not to intervene. In this case, the
relevant threshold rate of fundamentals under which a default







under the realization of fundamentals, despite the withdrawals
and the non-intervention by the IMF, a default does not occur.
Note that, although its fundamentals are not weak, the country
incurs a speculative attack anyway. This situation can reflect the
case of capital outflows due to a lack of confidence by the agents.
Otherwise, for every other realized value of fundamentals a default
occurs. 
In the case of b > c, the threshold signals are shifted to the
left of the threshold rates of fundamentals. 
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GRAPH 3




If S < S* a crisis always occurs. If S > S*, fund managers roll
over their loans and the IMF intervenes, supporting the country.
A crisis does not occur even if the state of fundamentals is not so
favourable. In fact, in the range defined within S* and 
–
RL, the
realizations of fundamentals are such that if x = 1 occurs, the
country would not have enough resources to pay back fundmanagers and a default would occur, even with an IMF
intervention. But the preference structure makes fund managers
more willing to roll over their loans and the IMF more willing to
intervene. In the multiple equilibria range, where S* < S < S*,
what occurs depends on the relevant threshold selection. If S* is
chosen, then we have x = 0; but in the range between S* and RS
the country is insolvent and a default occurs anyway, despite the
roll over of the debt. This situation may be due to excessive agent
confidence. With rates greater than RS there is no default. We will
have a default however, if S* is chosen as the relevant threshold. 
As in CGR, threshold values of signals are decreasing in b and
increasing in c. Also the relevant IMF threshold is decreasing in
B and increasing in C. Different values of these parameters can
lead to very different agent and IMF behaviour. Also intuitively
speaking, it is clear that greater values of b and smaller values of
c, which imply a greater utility for the correct roll over of a loan,
and a lesser punishment for a wrong roll over, make fund
managers more confident (more risk takers) in their loan roll overs
to the country. The opposite is true for b < c. Thus this model can
be very useful in reflecting effects observed in reality, notably
excesses and deficits of confidence. 
5. - Differences in the Preference Structure 
A natural extension of our analysis leads to eliminating the
hypothesis of identical preferences between fund managers and
the IMF, assuming that they are determined by different
parameters. This is straightforward because of the different
objectives of fund managers and the IMF. In fact, while fund
managers seek to maximize their profits and minimize the risks
of losing their capital if a crisis occurs, the IMF seeks to maximize
the possibility that a country avoids a crisis or, if a crisis occurs,
can survive it. Moreover, it seeks to minimize the probability of
losing the liquidity support L. Then, parameters b, c, B, C
depending on different factors, may be distinct. 
Given the structure of thresholds of the IMF and fund
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coincide when:
In order for thresholds to coincide it is necessary and sufficient
that parameters are equals in relative terms. It follows that: 
PROPOSITION 3: If preferences are not equal in relative terms
between fund managers and the IMF, then the thresholds at which
agents switch their behaviour do not coincide. 
There could be two scenarios, conditional on  B/C > b/c or B/C
< b/c. The proof of Proposition 3 will be analyzed in three distinct
lemmas. 
LEMMA 1: If B/C > b/c, then S*
IMF < S*.
This conclusion derives from the fact that 
Being both negative terms inside the thresholds, we have S*
IMF
< S*. If the IMF gains a greater utility following a correct strategy,
it is more willing to undertake this strategy. 
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GRAPH 4
DETERMINATION OF EQUILIBRIA AS IN LEMMA 1
S* S*
IMF S*In this situation, when S  ≤ S*, S > S*, there is a unique
equilibrium, exactly as above. When S* < S ≤ S* there are multiple
equilibria. But this case is different from the preceding one,
because thresholds of fund managers and the IMF do not coincide.
If S* is chosen as the relevant threshold, fund managers roll over
all their loans to the country and the IMF intervention is
superfluous (to analyze the possibility of a crisis refer to the
preceding section). Instead, if S* is chosen as the relevant
threshold, since S ≤ S*, fund managers decide to withdraw their
loans (x = 1). But, at this point, a crisis is not certain to occur.
In fact, if S ≤ S*
IMF the IMF does not intervene and the relevant
threshold rate becomes – R. Instead, when S*
IMF < S ≤ S*, the IMF
decides to intervene anyway — although fund managers withdraw
their loans — and the relevant threshold rate of fundamentals is
still 
–
RL. This case is particularly important because there is
heterogeneity between the behaviour of fund managers and that
of the IMF. Although the withdrawals of fund managers can make
a crisis possible, the IMF is able to avoid it with a partial bailout
of the country. This structure implies that, even in case of multiple
equilibria, the IMF can avoid several liquidity crises with a limited
liquidity support.
LEMMA 2: If B/C < b/c, there must be  
–
S* ≤ S*
IMF in order to
have equilibrium. 
In fact, if the preference structure is such that B/C < b/c, then
we would have a situation where S* < S*
IMF. This situation is a
contradiction in terms. In fact, when calculating the threshold S*,
it is necessary to consider the probability, conditional on the IMF
intervention. But, for every value of the signal S<  S *
IMF, the IMF
does not intervene. Therefore this conditional probability is equal
to 0; it is impossible to calculate S* when the signal is S<  S *
IMF.
Furthermore, for every value of the signal S>S *, fund managers
roll over their loans to the country (x = 0) and this prevents the
existence of threshold S*
IMF that is conditional on the complete
withdrawal of loans by fund managers (x = 1). Thus, if the two
thresholds have values such as S* < S*
IMF, there is a contradiction
as regards the meaning of the thresholds. They can never be in
that position. When S* < S*
IMF, there isn’t equilibrium. 
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equilibrium, they always must have the following relation: S*
IMF ≤
S*. Hence, this definition includes the first two cases, but not the
third because its preference structure contrasts with this
conclusion
11. 
In this third case, when the signal is S < S*
IMF, the relevant
threshold value for fund managers cannot be S* but
–
S*, calculated
based on the equilibrium conjecture x = 1 (like the preceding case),
















R, we have S* < 
–
S*. At this point, there is a problem
similar to the preceding one for threshold
–
S* in fact it cannot be
greater than S* IMF. This is because, for every value of the signal
S>S * IMF, the IMF decides to intervene, then in this interval the
threshold – S* cannot exist, because for such values of the signal
the conditional probability on the IMF non-intervention is equal
to 0. In fact, in the first two cases, this probability does not
influence the equilibrium determination anyway. Therefore, in this





LEMMA 3: When B/C < b/c, 
–
S* ≤ S*
IMF if equation (11) is satisfied.
Substituting the corresponding formulas to the two thresholds,
we have: 
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11 This result can be achieved by substituting its formula to each threshold
value. We can see that in order to have S*
IMF ≤ S*, there must be B/C ≥ b/c.that is:
where both sides of the inequality are positive members. Given
the fact that
–
RL depends on the dimension of the liquidity support
L, this variable has a critical role. By using (3) and  (5) and
substituting them into the left hand side member, we obtain the
following rationality constraint:
(11)
Hence, this constraint depends on L (as mentioned above),
but also on k and  I
12. This condition must be satisfied to have
equilibrium with B/C < b/c. We can see how different values of the
cost of liquidation k impose different strategies on the IMF. If k
→∞ , we can see from (11) that  L is necessarily equal to 0 —
because it cannot be equal to negative values. This achievement
of the model may seem counterintuitive, but remember that this
is the case in which L < D – M. In such a case, with infinite
liquidation costs, the country always defaults and for this reason
the IMF does not provide any liquidity support. Note that the
default is caused only by the fact that the liquidity support L is
not sufficient to cover the liquidity gap (L < D – M). On the other
hand, if k → 0,  L can assume the maximum possible value
provided it remains smaller than D – M. 
As said before, 
–
S* must not be greater than S*
IMF. When S ≤
–
S*,
fund managers do not roll over their loans to the country, the IMF




IMF, in spite of the IMF non-intervention, fund managers,
aware of it, decide to roll over their loans to the country anyway.
Naturally if S>S *
IMF the IMF intervenes and all fund managers




R, there is S*< 
–
S*. In this
case, the range of multiple equilibria is larger than in the previous
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12 Being L < D – M we can also establish: 






















− 11case and then the probabilities of a crisis are consequently higher.
This situation is only caused by the preference structure which
characterizes a very conservative IMF, one that is very unwilling
to intervene. 
When L > D – M, even if preferences are note equal in relative
terms, the conclusions of the model do not change. In fact, if the
IMF is able to fill the whole liquidity gap of the country by itself,
there aren’t any liquidation costs left and only solvency crises
occur. The threshold rate of fundamentals under which a default
occurs is always RS, as in Proposition 2. The role of a liquidity
provision of such dimension is above all that it can eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria.
The conditional threshold on x = 0 is exogenous, in the sense
that it depends only on D, M, I, which are predetermined
parameters. This threshold cannot be influenced by the IMF and
fund managers’ decisions. Thus, in this case, preferences do not
play any role. 
A liquidity crisis can be completely avoided only with the IMF
acting as an ILOLR, but our framework shows that, even with a
limited liquidity support, the IMF can still play a decisive role.
When the IMF provides a liquidity support, is able to prevent some
crises that would otherwise occur. Moreover, this framework
proves that if the IMF follows a very conservative strategy, it makes
a crisis more likely, even when the fundamentals of the economy
are not weak. Thus, the IMF should not adopt this conservative
strategy. 
6. - Liquidity and Moral Hazard
One of the main criticisms of the models à la Diamond-
Dybvig, based on the hypothesis of common knowledge, regards
their inability to capture moral hazard distortions, due to excessive
liquidity provision by the IMF. The prescription of an international
lender of last resort, that emerges from these types of models,
should be deeply reviewed with the presence of moral hazard. For
this reason, a major innovation of models based on global games
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It is possible to find a general treatment of the incentives faced
by the government both in CGR and in Morris and Shin (2003)
13. 
In this section we propose an analysis of the incentives faced
by the government in the multiple equilibria framework,
borrowing the incentives framework of CGR. We will see if this
framework is able to represent moral hazard distortions due to
liquidity provisions by the IMF, when it does not fill the whole
liquidity gap with its intervention. An international lender of last
resort will create, without any doubt, moral hazard distortions
14.
Some adjustments to the basic framework of the model are
necessary. Assume that the rate of return R is distributed as
R≈N(Rj, 1/ρ). The mean Rj (with j = N, A) depends on the effort
of the government, if it undertakes costly reforms to improve the
economic efficiency of the country (action A) or not (action N).
The probability distribution of R — but not its mean, which is
not observable — is common knowledge. For simplicity, we
assume perfect information
15. Therefore there are two equilibria.
One equilibrium is conditional on the conjecture x = 0. With
complete information, the only relevant threshold is RS. The
threshold that determines the other equilibrium is conditional on
x = 1 by fund managers and on the IMF intervention; it is
–
RL. It
is necessary to introduce an exogenous mechanism for the
selection of the equilibrium threshold, because there are multiple
equilibria for a certain range. Thus, we assign a probability ξ to
the selection of threshold RS and, with complementarity, a
probability (1 – ξ) to the selection of threshold
–
RL. The welfare
function of the government is: 
W = U – Ψ = E0Y – Ψ
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13 An analysis of the same moral hazard distortions, but with quite different
models, can be found in JEANNE O. - ZETTELMEYER J. (2004), and CORDELLA T. -
LEVY-YEYATI E. (2004). 
14 For an analysis of moral hazard distortions with an international lender of
last resort see DOOLEY M. - VERMA S. (2001). 
15 In order to have perfect information it suffices to make ρ→0. Where  U is the utility of the domestic representative agent
and Ψ is the welfare cost of undertaking action A. This cost falls
on the government only, and is motivated by exogenous
considerations — i.e. electoral costs. Hence W does not coincide
with U that is measured by GNP
16. Let ∆R = RA - RN. The utility
of the government is different whether the costly action A is
undertaken or no action is undertaken. Also the dimension of ∆R
influences the government decisions. If fundamentals are inside
the range of multiple equilibria, the welfare function and, above
all, the utility difference between action A and action N will
crucially depend on ξ. Naturally, as in CGR, the dimension of
threshold 
–
RL also influences the optimal strategy of the
government. Since 
–
RL depends on the liquidity provision L by the
IMF, examining the effects of L on ∆W can show possible moral
hazard distortions due to an excessive liquidity provision L. It is
necessary to consider the position assumed by RN e RA compared
to thresholds RS and  
–
RL in order to analyze the effects ξ and L
variations on ∆W. 
As seen before, ∆W is equal to the difference between W(A)
and  W(N). The welfare function can assume different values
depending on the relevant threshold value of fundamentals. When
the relevant threshold is RS, GNP is [RI + M – D]; instead,
considering as the relevant one, GNP is given by [RI + M – D –
k(D – M – L)].
There are some limiting cases. In fact, if RN,  RA ≤ RS the
equilibrium is unique, fund managers always withdraw their loans
in t = 1 and the IMF does not intervene. The country is not solvent
even if it undertakes action A, and a default always occurs.
Different values of L and ξ cannot influence government actions. 
If RN, RA > 
–
RL, we still have a unique equilibrium, where fund
managers roll over and the IMF intervention is unimportant.
Accordingly, function ∆W does not depend on L and ξ. Then:
∆W = [RI + M – D][F(R|RA) – F(R|RN)] – Ψ
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16 In this version of the model, because of the information structure, there is
no need to integrate the welfare function of the government as in CGR.The government decides to undertake the costly action A if
∆W is positive, otherwise it does not exert any effort. ∆W is
positively influenced by the difference RA – RN and negatively
influenced by costs of reform Ψ. ξ does not play any role, because
the equilibrium is unique. The liquidity provision L is not
influential, but only when
–
RL < RN, otherwise we fall inside the
multiple equilibria range. 
There is another limiting case when RN < RS and RA > 
–
RL. If
the government does not undertake the action A, it defaults. If the
government undertakes the action A, there will be a unique
equilibrium with x = 0. We have:
W(A) = ∆W = [RI + M – D] F(R|RA) – Ψ
The government always has a positive incentive to undertake
the action A, excluding the limiting case of W(A) ≤ 0. As above,
∆W is not influenced by variables ξ and L. 
Scenarios encompassing multiple equilibria are more
interesting. The first one is defined by RN < RS and RS < RA < 
–
RL.
Here, if the government does not undertake the action A, it will
default for sure (W(N) = 0). The only possibility to avoid a crisis
is undertaking action A. But, since RA falls inside the range
characterized by multiple equilibria, a crisis may always occur,
depending on the threshold selection. We have: 
W(A) = ∆W = [ξ(RI + M – D) +
+ (1 – ξ)(RI + M – D – k(D – M – L))] F(R|RA) – Ψ
In this case ∆W depends on both ξ and L. Deriving the above
formula, we can understand the role played by these two variables
on the welfare of the government: 
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158The net increase of welfare obtained undertaking action A
compared to action N, is increasing in the two variables ξ and L.
In fact, being RA within the range of multiple equilibria, a crisis
is always possible and it would occur when threshold  
–
RL is chosen.
An increase in ξ means an increase in the probability that RS is
chosen as the relevant threshold, then it means a reduction of the
probability of a crisis. An increase in L decreases  
–
RL, and therefore
increases the probability that the country could avoid a crisis in
t = 1. In this case, the liquidity provision L does not decrease
incentives for the government to undertake the costly action A.
This is also caused by the fact that RN < RS, and then by the fact
that the country, without action A, would certainly incur a crisis. 
In this case, it is possible to speak of strategic complementarity
between the actions by the IMF and the government. In fact the
IMF is interested in intervening only if the country does not
default in t = 1, and such possibility increases undertaking action
A and with the size of L and  ξ. Whereas the country, which is
discouraged by bleak prospects of success, is interested in
undertaking action A only for sufficient liquidity provisions L to
considerably increase the probability of a good economic outcome.
These implications are perfectly in tune with the implications
found in CGR and with the theory of catalytic finance of Morris
and Shin (2003).
The second case, regarding multiple equilibria, is
characterized by: RS < RN < 
–
RL and RA > 
–
RL. Here the country has
the possibility not to incur a default, even without undertaking
action A. But this possibility is conditional on the choice of the
relevant threshold within the range of multiple equilibria. Here,
the country is able to avoid anyway a possible crisis undertaking
action A. The two welfare functions are:
W(N)=[ ξ (RI + M – D)+( 1–ξ)( RI + M –D–k (D–M–L ))] F(R|RN)
W(A) = [RI + M – D] F(R|RA) – Ψ
The utility difference between the two welfare functions is: 
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159∆W =[ RI + M – D] F(R|RA) – [ξ (RI + M – D) + 
+ (1 – ξ) (RI + M – D – k(D – M – L))] F(R|RN) – Ψ
As above, we can calculate the partial derivatives to see how
changes in ξ e L can influence ∆W. We have:
The derivatives are both negative in this case. When ξ or L
increase, the utility gained by undertaking the costly action A
decreases. In fact, because of RN falling within the range of
multiple equilibria, an increase in ξ increases the probability that
RS is chosen as the relevant threshold and then that a crisis does
not occur even without action A. At the same time, an increase
in  L, making 
–
RL decrease, with the same ξ, decreases the
probability of a crisis. Hence, an increase in L decreases the
incentives for the government to undertake the action A, and
decreases expected GNP. This result, again in tune with CGR, is
particularly important because it proves how a multiple equilibria
model can reflect the possible moral hazard distortions. 
The last case is characterized by RS < RN, RA < 
–
RL. Here, both
welfare functions depend on ξ and L. The welfare functions and
their difference are: 
W(N) = [ξ(RI + M – D) +
+ (1 – ξ) (RI + M – D – k(D – M – L))] F(R|RN)
W(A) = [ξ(RI + M – D) +
+ (1 – ξ) (RI + M – D – k(D – M – L))] F(R|RA) – Ψ
∆W = [ξ(RI + M – D) + 
+(1 – ξ) (RI + M – D – k(D – M – L))][F(R|RA) –F (R|RN)] – Ψ
Partial derivatives are:
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160∆W is increasing in ξ and L; and the size of this increasing
ratio depends on the term [F(R|RA) – F(R|RN)]. If this term is large,
an increase in ξ will cause a greater increase in ∆W. The same
reasoning applies to L.
However, an increase in ξ means an increase in the probability
of choosing RS as the relevant threshold, and then a decrease in
the probability of default choosing either RN or RA. Examining the
derivative with respect to ξ, the welfare function is increasing in
ξ, hence an increase in ξ should increase the incentive to
undertake the costly action A. On the other hand, an increase in
ξ decreases the probability of a crisis even if action A is not
undertaken, but our framework is not able to capture this effect. 
The reasoning about L is similar to the preceding one. In fact
an increase in L, should lead to an increase in welfare and should
increase incentives to undertake action A. In fact a reduction of
–
RL decreases the possibility of a crisis. But the possibility of a
crisis is reduced for both RA and  RN. Also here, our framework
does not capture the diminishing effect of an increased liquidity
support L on the incentive for the government effort. In this case,
moral hazard distortions should emerge, but they are absent in
our framework. 
In conclusion, the case in which RS < RN <
–
RL and RA > 
–
RL
can correctly represent such moral hazard distortions and
represents a major censure to the institution of an ILOLR. While
the case in which RN < RS and RS < RA < 
–
RL properly describes
the phenomenon of strategic complementarity and catalytic
finance. Note that these implications do not conflict with those
stated in the previous section. But this framework does not
provide a correct representation of incentives within the range of
multiple equilibria. This lack derives from the existence of
multiple equilibria — and then the partition of possible outcomes
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161of fundamentals — and also from the information structure which,
being complete, completely eliminates uncertainty. Thus, there are
the well-known problems of lack of heterogeneity in agents’
behaviour, exogenous mechanisms (not explained inside the
model) of threshold selection, etc. 
Holmostrom and Tirole (1998) show that in a domestic
context the government must increase the liquidity supply in the
case of a higher liquidity shock and decrease this supply otherwise.
The international implications for the IMF that arise from moral
hazard analysis, are substantially aligned with the domestic
observations of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Hence, these
implications have a broader range, underlining the importance of
the IMF as the international liquidity regulator. 
However it is very important that the obtained results are
substantially (though not completely) in accord with the results
obtained both in CGR and in Morris and Shin (2003) under the
hypothesis of global games. This demonstrates the validity of the
theoretical framework as well as the flexibility of the information
structure, which is able to express an accurate representation of
incentives under different hypotheses. 
7. - Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown a model of financial crises. We
have exploited the basic framework of CGR (based on the global
games assumption) to develop a multiple equilibria model based
on the hypothesis of common knowledge. Being a real model, we
have left out the aspects regarding currency fragilities. 
In the first part we have reached conclusions in agreement
with the preceding literature about crises models with multiple
equilibria. The emerging of a currency crisis can be eliminated
only if the IMF act as an international lender of last resort,
providing a liquidity support sufficient to eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria. 
But, differing from the preceding literature, the probability of
a crisis is also correlated to the strength of fundamentals. Thus,
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providing a liquidity support able to eliminate the multiplicity of
equilibria. 
In the second part, we have been able to observed how the
preference structure influences our analysis. A generalized
preference structure makes the determination of equilibria more
realistic, creating distinct equilibrium positions for the IMF and
fund managers. A greater or lesser willingness, of the IMF, to
provide a liquidity support can modify the probability of a crisis,
with all the other parameters remaining unvaried. A more willing
IMF is able to avoid a crisis with a partial bailout, even if fund
managers withdraw their loans. On the other hand, a very
conservative IMF can make a crisis more likely. An interesting
continuation of this research would be extending this generalized
preference structure to models based on global games. 
Since the preceding literature about models à la Diamond-
Dybvig does not take into account moral hazard distortions that
could be caused by an international lender of last resort, in the
last section we have made up for this lack. Apart from one
particular case, we obtained very similar results as the ones in
CGR and in Morris and Shin (2003). In opposition to the main
predictions arising from multiple equilibria models, the possibility
of self-fulfilling crises does not necessarily justify the solution of
a complete bailout in the event of a crisis. In fact an international
lender of last resort certainly creates moral hazard distortions.
Moreover, the argument that liquidity provisions always induce
debtor moral hazard is not correct. In fact there could be either
moral hazard distortions or strategic complementarity between the
country and the IMF. The latter gives rise to an important role
for catalytic finance. 
Hence, this paper’s main conclusion is that the IMF should
provide sufficiently limited liquidity supports to avoid moral
hazard distortions, yet also be more willing to intervene in order
to prevent pure liquidity crises.
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